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NOTES 
STARSHIPS AND ENTERPRISE: PRIVATE 
SPACEFLIGHT COMPANIES’ PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND THE U.S. COMMERCIAL 
SPACE LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS ACT 
STEPHEN DIMARIA† 
INTRODUCTION 
Although individual States and the international community 
spent decades attempting to set up a legal regime in advance of 
humanity’s return to outer space, technology is quickly beginning 
to outpace law in a race out of the atmosphere.  A recent NASA-
funded study estimated that the United States, in partnership 
with private industry, could return humans to the moon in as 
little as five to seven years for about $10 billion.1  That same 
study also contemplated the possibilities of an estimated $40 
billion lunar base, which would dramatically cut costs in future 
missions to Mars.2 
Private space flight continues to flourish with companies like 
Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries beginning 
programs and launching tests for prospecting lucrative resources 
housed in asteroids.3  Further, a study published by The Keck 
Institute for Space Studies estimated that finding a resource-rich 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. John’s 
University School of Law. I would like to thank my family for their innumerable 
lessons and fervent support. I would also like to thank Assistant Dean Jeffrey 
Walker for shaping this paper with our shared “a-ha moments,” and Professors 
Christopher Borgen and Margaret McGuinness for their extremely valuable further 
insight and teaching. 
1 NASA-Funded Study Reduces Cost of Human Missions to  
Moon and Mars by Factor of Ten, NSS.ORG (July 20, 2015), 
http://www.nss.org/news/releases/NSS_Release_20150720_LunarArchitecture.html. 
2 Id. (explaining plans to harvest propellant from asteroids, store it in lunar 
orbit, and use it to resupply spacecraft for further exploration). 
3 James M. Smith, Space: The Orbital Industry, THEMARKETMOGUL.COM, 
http://themarketmogul.com/space-orbital-industry (last visited Sept. 14, 2016). 
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asteroid and bringing it into Earth’s orbit for mining would cost 
only $2.6 billion.4  Compare these lowered costs to the potentially 
enormous rewards in harvesting precious metals, helium-3, and 
even water, and it becomes rather obvious why both 
governmental and private entities are already on their way back 
to the bounty of outer space.5 
Although the technology surrounding outer space exploration 
and resource harvesting has dramatically improved, many 
scholars agree that the surrounding legal regime remains 
unclear.6  Without a legal mechanism to ensure property rights 
in harvested outer space materials, both governments and 
private companies may hesitate to undertake the high risks and 
costs of obtaining space resources without assurances that they 
will truly own them.7  Alternatively, as this Note discusses, 
allowing parties to acquire space resources without further 
clarifying some restrictions has the potential to breach 
international obligations in the distant future.8  In response to 
developing technology and this unclear legal regime, scholars 
have recommended immediate action to enact more substantive 
space law before technology has developed the ability to reach 
celestial bodies.9 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id. (discussing the economic potential of precious metals and water on 
asteroids); Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the 
Moon: U.S. Policy Options, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 243–46 (2010) (discussing 
the potential value of helium-3 as an extremely effective and environmentally 
friendly isotope for thermonuclear energy). Although all of the celestial bodies with 
which this Note is concerned are clearly located in “Outer Space,” defining where 
that boundary begins and Earth ends has proven troublesome. See generally 
Theodore W. Goodman, To the End of the Earth: A Study of the Boundary Between 
Earth and Space, 36 J. SPACE L. 87 (2010). 
6 Rosanna Sattler, Transporting A Legal System for Property Rights: From the 
Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 27–29 (2005); Kyle A. Jacobsen, Comment, 
From Interstate to Interstellar Commerce: Incorporating the Private Sector into 
International Aerospace Law, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 191 (2014); Blake Gilson, Note, 
Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar 
Litigator, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1367 (2011). 
7 Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the 
Commercial World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 81 
(2005); Kurt Anderson Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 
1041, 1045 (1993). 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 Bilder, supra note 5, at 277–80; Sattler, supra note 6, at 44. But compare 
Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 95, with Byron C. Brittingham, Does the 
World Really Need New Space Law?, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 31, 48 (2010). 
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In 2015, the House of Representatives offered a legal 
structure in H.R. 2262, the Spurring Private Aerospace 
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015––or the 
“SPACE Act”––which was later passed under the U.S. 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (“SLCA”).10  
Fittingly, the stated purpose of the act is to make regulatory 
conditions more predictable, and, as stated in a report by the 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee, SLCA attempts to 
add some stability to the uncertain legal regime of property 
rights in space resources.11 
SLCA seeks to clarify property rights by an amendment to 
51 U.S.C.A. § 51303: 
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an 
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be 
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, 
including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid 
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with 
applicable law, including the international obligations of the 
United States.12 
Further, the proposed amendments originally included a 
civil action against harmful interference with asteroid resource 
operations, provided the aggrieved party: (1) acted in accordance 
with the international obligations of the United States; (2) was 
first in time; and (3) acted reasonably for exploration and 
utilization of asteroid resources.13  However, that provision has 
since been removed and replaced with a simple statement that 
the President shall promote outer space resource recovery free 
from harmful interference.14 
Critics of the act have attacked the property rights regime as 
controversial in light of an uncertain structure of existing space 
law.15  Because SLCA relies on meeting international obligations 
 
10 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act § 402, 
51 U.S.C.A. §§ 51301–03 (West 2015). 
11 H.R. REP. NO. 114–119, at 8 (2015). 
12 51 U.S.C.A. § 51303. 
13 SPACE Act, H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015). 
14 51 U.S.C.A. § 51302(a)(3) (West 2015). 
15 Doug Messier, House Democrats Slam SPACE Act as “Commercial Space 
Industry Wish List”, PARABOLICARC.COM (May 21, 2015, 12:04 PM), 
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2015/05/21/house-democrats-slam-space-act-
commercial-space-industry-list. Objection by both private and public parties to the 
SPACE Act has been far reaching. However, this Note focuses only on the issue of 
property rights in outer space resources. 
FINAL_DIMARIA 10/20/2016  8:43 AM 
418 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:415   
in resource acquisition, these critics raise a legitimate question 
as to the effectiveness of unilateral grants of space resource 
property rights.16  Further, these domestic objections may 
eventually return as international complaints.  However, without 
imposing some type of regulation by unilateral action, the United 
States might have found its private companies venturing into 
outer space without any guiding principles of law except the 
unclear regime that was already in place. 
This Note utilizes SLCA as a focal point to discuss the 
potential of domestic regulation that grants private companies 
property rights in harvested outer space resources and how, if at 
all, these rights can exist within the boundaries of current 
international obligations.  First, it outlines current international 
obligations in space law, delving into the treaties governing space 
law and analagous obligations in Antarctica and the deep sea.  
Second, this Note discusses how SLCA meets those guidelines 
and where it falls short.  This Part draws on the Roman law 
principles of res nullius and res communis, the supporting 
sections of the Act itself, and analogies to the water law regime 
in the western United States to both support the Act and 
establish its shortcomings.  Finally, this Note concludes that 
private companies can harvest space resources under SLCA 
consistently with the United States’ international obligations, 
but a sunset provision on this property rights regime, limiting its 
duration to a set term of years or until an updated international 
treaty regime is established, may be necessary to remain in 
compliance with international obligations. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In order to determine the international obligations of the 
United States—and therefore, of its private spaceflight 
companies under SLCA—it is necessary to explore the unclear 
boundaries of existing space law and a few analogous treaty 
regimes.17  The primary treaty concerning outer space property 
rights is the Outer Space Treaty, to which the United States is 
 
16 See 161 CONG. REC. H8190 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2015) (Statement of Rep. 
Edwards) (“I am concerned that we are rushing to establish policy on space resource 
mining and utilization without having vetted the range of issues associated with it 
and without having carried out the necessary due diligence to inform legislation that 
relates to our international treaty obligations with our international partners.”). 
17 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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party.18  Additionally, the Moon Agreement presents significant 
context for outer space property rights in international law, 
although the United States has not signed or ratified the 
agreement.19  However, with both treaties in place, the United 
States has taken unilateral steps to preserve property rights in 
objects it has harvested from outer space.  Finally, looking 
towards the future of space law, analogous international law and 
obligations provide some guidance through the Third Law of the 
Sea Convention20 and the various treaties comprising the 
Antarctic Treaty System.21 
In order to better understand the qualities of property rights 
under the current treaty regime, background property principles 
from Roman law help frame the discussion.  The Romans defined 
different categories of things subject to varying types and extents 
of ownership, including res communis and res nullius.22  Res 
communis were meant to be enjoyed and shared by all people in 
common.23  Res nullius included things not subject to standing 
ownership, but attainable by the first person to occupy or capture 
the property.24  The following international property regimes help 
to identify the place where resource rights in outer space fall 
between the two. 
 
 
18 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter “Outer Space Treaty”]. 
19 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, adopted Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 21 [hereinafter “Moon 
Agreement”]. 
20 See generally Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final 
Act, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (Dec. 10, 1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 
[hereinafter “UNCLOS”]. 
21 See generally Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; 
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, June 2, 1964, 
17 U.S.T. 996; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 
U.S.T. 441, 1080 U.N.T.S. 175; Convention and Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47. 
22 PAUL DU PLESSIS, BORKOWSKI’S TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 152 (5th ed. 
2015). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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A. The Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967, presents the first 
international regulation of outer space.25  According to its annex, 
the Outer Space Treaty attempts to ensure international 
cooperation in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space, 
while prohibiting the presence of nuclear weapons.26  Aside from 
Articles I and II, which directly impact property rights, a few 
other noncontroversial international obligations bind parties to 
the treaty and possibly bind private enterprises launching from 
those parties.27  First dispensing with these noncontroversial 
provisions, one of the central obligations of the Outer Space 
Treaty is contained in Article IV, which prohibits the presence of 
weapons of mass destruction or any military action in outer 
space.28  Further, Article V mandates that parties must render 
all possible assistance to all other parties’ astronauts, and inform 
the United Nations of any conditions that may pose a hazard.29 
Articles XI and XII impose disclosure requirements, 
mandating that spacefarers must keep the public informed of 
their activities, and allow for other parties to visit outer space 
installations after appropriate notice.30  Finally, the last major 
requirement that may affect private entities in outer space comes 
from Article IX, which expands on the requirements of 
international cooperation in outer space.31  Article IX mandates 
that parties must act with due regard to other nations’ interests 
in outer space and avoid contamination of celestial bodies.32  
Opponents of SLCA may cite the cooperation principles of Article 
IX to prohibit the act’s unilateral grant of resource rights, but 
 
25 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18. 
26 Id. 
27 Articles VI and VII together provide that States party to the treaty must 
authorize and supervise the outer space activity of nongovernment entities 
launching from their territory, further requiring any launching State to accept 
liability for any damages caused by even private entities. Id. arts. VI–VII. 
28 Id. art. IV. 
29 Id. art. V. 
30 Id. arts. XI–XII. 
31 Id. art. IX. 
32 Id. Some scholars argue that environmental controls and cooperation 
requirements reflect the inclusion of the “common heritage of mankind” principle in 
the Outer Space Agreement before its first formal expression in UNCLOS. See, e.g., 
Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, 
Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach A 
Compromise?, Note, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 420–25 (2003). See infra Section III.B., 
for a full description of the common heritage principle. 
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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/122 allows 
States to fully determine the extent of their international 
cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space.33  While the 
preceding provisions may not significantly impact parties 
operating under SLCA, the remaining relevant articles dealing 
with property in outer space present a greater impediment. 
Articles I and II of the treaty provide the sparse property 
rights regime currently in place.  Generally more expansive, 
Article II plainly states that “[o]uter space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation 
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means.”34  Article I remains a bit less clear, dictating that 
“[t]he exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be the province 
of all mankind” and that “States shall facilitate and encourage 
international co-operation,” while simultaneously espousing 
unrestricted development of outer space through 
“free . . . exploration and use” and “free access.”35  While the less-
clear mandates of Article I may restrict outer space property 
rights in the distant future, the broader restrictions of Article II 
present a more plain issue. 
First, Article II raises concerns over whether a private entity 
can avoid its authority by claiming private property rights, 
rather than committing a national appropriation.36  Generally, 
private American companies may be bound by the United 
States’s full obligations under Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty, which states that States party are responsible for the 
actions of private parties launched from their territories.37  
Alternatively, Article II itself limits appropriation by any means, 
not just national claims of appropriation, and therefore may 
 
33 G.A. Res. 51/122, ¶ 2 (Dec. 13, 1996). This definition of cooperation also comes 
into play regarding Article I, the first provision of the Outer Space Treaty that 
mandates international cooperation. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art. I. 
34 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art. II. 
35 Id. art. I. 
36 Gilson, supra note 6, at 1388–90; Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope 
for International Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession 
Principles into the 1967 Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the 
Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 332–33 (2004). 
37 Gilson, supra note 6, at 1388–90. “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear 
international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental 
agencies or by non-governmental entities.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art. 
VI. 
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impact private companies, as well.38  Article II serves as an even 
stronger regulation in outer space because, as some scholars have 
argued, it is given the force of customary international law.39 
With regards to SLCA, private parties acquire property 
rights in materials harvested consistent with the “international 
obligations of the United States.”40  Therefore, even if private 
companies are not subject to Article II’s ban on national 
appropriation, they must meet the United States’s obligations 
under Article II in order to attain property rights under SLCA.  
Directly addressing this burden, SLCA has even expressly 
attempted to avoid the national appropriation issue by 
affirmatively stating that its authorizations do not constitute a 
claim of national sovereignty.41  Even if that statement is 
ineffective, a few scholars have concluded that Article II does not 
affect private companies harvesting outer space resources 
because national sovereignty is not a necessary predicate for 
private parties to obtain property rights.42 
Second, Article II fails to resolve whether merely harvesting 
resources—rather than making territorial claims—constitutes an 
appropriation, although Article I provides a more direct 
application to the issue.43  By its various provisions on free 
exploration, use, and access, the Outer Space Treaty is very 
permissive regarding space resources, likely extending into 
allowing resource acquisition despite the appropriation limits of 
Article II.44  Because the Outer Space Treaty is the only space 
law treaty binding the United States on property rights, there 
does not appear to be anything preventing outer space resource 
acquisition.45  Such a pure lack of property right regulation would 
lead to a “first in time, first in right” structure of ownership in  
 
 
38 Gilson, supra note 6, at 1388–90. 
39 F. Kenneth Schwetje, Protecting Space Assets: A Legal Analysis of “Keep Out 
Zones”, 15 J. SPACE L. 131, 141 (1987) (discussing that Article II may, as customary 
international law, affect nations that have not ratified the Outer Space Treaty). 
40 51 U.S.C.A. § 51303 (West 2015). 
41 Id. § 403. 
42 Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 97–98; Alexander W. Salter & 
Peter T. Leeson, Celestial Anarchy: A Threat to Outer Space Commerce?, 34 CATO J. 
581, 583 (2014). 
43 Sattler, supra note 6, at 28–29. 
44 Baca, supra note 7, at 1066. 
45 Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 83; Bilder, supra note 5, at 273–
74. 
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line with the Roman law ownership principle of res nullius 
through possession, as long as parties avoid national 
appropriations.46 
However, Article I reserves outer space as the province of all 
mankind, at least vaguely limiting property rights if not, as some 
scholars argue, fully reserving resources to common use in line 
with the Roman law principle of res communis.47  Regardless, 
some scholars argue that Article I’s permissiveness on 
exploration and use make the treaty amenable to resource 
acquisition even if it includes some common use principles.48  
This res communis principle caused a great deal of controversy 
when potentially expressed through the term “common heritage 
of mankind” in the next major treaty to deal with property right 
in space, the Moon Agreement.49 
B. The Moon Agreement 
The Moon Agreement, opened for signature in 1979 as the 
most recent multilateral attempt at expanding space law, 
addresses the need to clarify and expand the legal regime 
surrounding the use of outer space in its annex.50  Although it is 
commonly known as the Moon Agreement, the Agreement also 
extends to “other celestial bodies,” implicitly including 
asteroids.51  However, only sixteen States have ratified the Moon 
Agreement as of January 1, 2015, none of which are spacefaring 
nations.52  Although these provisions are not directly binding on 
the United States, they may provide context for understanding 
its obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, or may eventually 
become obligations if the United States should eventually sign 
and ratify the Moon Agreement.53 
 
46 Gruner, supra note 36, at 345–46. For more on res nullius, see infra Section 
III.A. 
47 See generally Gruner, supra note 36; Gilson, supra note 6. For more on res 
communis, see infra Section III.A. 
48 Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. 
INT’L L. & PRAC. 359, 370 (1994). 
49 See generally Bilder, supra note 5; Frakes, supra note 32. 
50 Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 22. 
51 Id. 
52 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International 
Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2015, UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf. 
53 Bilder, supra note 5, at 269–70. 
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The controversy preventing the adoption of the Moon 
Agreement surrounds Article 11, a provision proposing a 
substantial property rights regime.54  Three particularly 
troublesome sections of Article 11 state: 
1. The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage 
of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this 
Agreement, in particular in paragraph 5 of this article. 
. . . 
3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any 
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property 
of any State, international intergovernmental or non-
governmental organization, national organization or non-
governmental entity or of any natural person. 
. . . 
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to 
establish an international régime, including appropriate 
procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources 
of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible.55 
These three sections of Article 11 each provide perceived 
detriments to the commercial exploitation of outer space that led 
to the agreement’s failure, but also evoke counterarguments that 
may point to its future success. 
First, the United States and other spacefaring States 
opposed the agreement’s use of the res communis “common 
heritage of mankind” principle, especially after that same 
principle caused UNCLOS to fail.56  Opponents of the Moon 
Agreement assert that the meaning of “common heritage of 
mankind” is fixed in international law and dictates equitable 
resource sharing under the direction of an international 
organization, as was proposed in UNCLOS.57  Supporters counter 
that the language of Article 11(1) expressly limits the usage of 
 
54 Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25. Although the limitation 
on property rights expressed in this Article only references the moon, per Article 1, 
the agreement’s provision applies to all celestial bodies in our solar system, aside 
from earth, until other legal norms are established for those bodies. Id. at 22. 
55 Id. at 25. Essentially, these three provisions mandate that celestial bodies are 
the common heritage of mankind, that no part of them are subject to any property 
right, and that an international organization must manage the natural resources on 
these celestial bodies. 
56 Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind 
Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 689, 699 (2004); Bilder, supra note 5, at 263–64. For more on UNCLOS, see 
infra Section II.D. 
57 Bilder, supra note 5, at 265; UNCLOS, supra note 20, 21 I.L.M. at 1271, 1293. 
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common heritage doctrine to the provisions of the agreement 
itself.58  Further, the agreement likely does not bar private 
entities from harvesting and retaining space resources because 
that interpretation would contradict the “free exploration and 
use” of the Outer Space Treaty.59  Finally, certain provisions of 
the Moon Agreement itself adjust equitable principles to favor 
the entities that acquired benefits from outer space.60 
Second, Article 11(3) caused controversy by, at first glance, 
prohibiting property rights in space resources.61  However, the 
United States proposed the term “in place” to attempt to offer 
some property rights for resource-harvesting entities.62  Further, 
parts of the agreement promote the collection of mineral samples 
for scientific purposes, and even those resources that are 
collected for economic purposes will likely include an additional 
scientific component for the foreseeable future.63 
Finally, Article 11(5) aroused opposition by subjecting lunar 
resources to an international organization’s control, again similar 
to deep-sea bed mining in UNCLOS.64  In response, supporters 
argue that the Moon Agreement does not dictate the type of 
resource regime that must exist in this international 
organization, merely that States party must undertake to 
establish one.65  Additionally, any party to the Moon Agreement 
that does not approve of the organization may refuse to join.66  
Finally, many scholars still support the idea of relying on an 
international organization to resolve the clarity issues in space 
law, and the Moon Agreement may provide the best framework to 
begin such a development.67 
Returning to SLCA, the United States is not restricted by 
the Moon Agreement because it is not a signatory.  Further, the 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty likely allow private entities 
to acquire space resources.68  To that effect, multiple United 
 
58 Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25. 
59 Baca, supra note 7, at 1066. 
60 Bilder, supra note 5, at 268–69. 
61 Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25. 
62 Bilder, supra note 5, at 267–68; Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for 
Exploitation of Outer Space Mineral Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 813 (2009). 
63 Tennen, supra note 62, at 813. 
64 Moon Agreement, supra note 19, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25. 
65 Bilder, supra note 5, at 266; Tennen, supra note 62, at 814. 
66 Bilder, supra note 5, at 267. 
67 See infra Section IV.A; Gilson, supra note 6, at 1402–05. 
68 See infra Section II.A; Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 7, at 83. 
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States government officials have opined that neither the Outer 
Space Treaty nor the Moon Agreement would stop private 
entities from obtaining property rights.69  However, private 
harvesting of space resources still may be hampered by the 
uncertainty of the international regime levied against the 
substantial cost of space prospecting.70  Regardless, the United 
States has its own precedent in supporting the position that 
property rights in space objects can stay consistent with 
international obligations. 
C. Existing Property Rights in Space Resources 
The United States has enforced its own property rights over 
moon rocks through sting operations on two separate occasions.71  
In one situation that went to trial, United States v. One Lucite 
Ball Containing Lunar Material,72 the United States succeeded 
in a forfeiture action to recover a stolen piece of moon rock 
retrieved on a NASA mission.73  The moon rock and 
accompanying plaque were given to Honduras as a gift, stolen 
from the country’s government, and then sold to a United States 
citizen in Florida.74  Establishing property rights in the moon 
rock was essential to the court’s analysis because, as the court 
quoted, “in order for property to be considered ‘stolen,’ the 
property must rightfully belong to someone other than the person 
who has it.”75  After succeeding in its case, the United States 
returned the moon rock to Honduras.76 
In the second major sting operation, federal agents and local 
law enforcement arrested a seventy-four-year-old woman who 
was attempting to sell a very small piece of moon rock that she 
claimed Neil Armstrong gave her husband, a NASA employee.77  
The United States further asserted its property rights in 
harvested lunar material by taking her moon rock, despite the 
 
69 Bilder, supra note 5, at 271. 
70 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
71 MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, THE LITTLE BOOK OF SPACE LAW 158–60 (2013). 
72 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
73 Id. at 1369. 
74 Id. at 1369–70. 
75 Id. at 1378 (quoting United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 
(MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
76 KLEIMAN, supra note 71, at 159. 
77 Id. at 160. 
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possibility that she may have obtained it legitimately as a gift.78  
Somewhat unsurprisingly, NASA has formally stated that all 
lunar material obtained on its missions is property of the United 
States.79  These types of unilateral property rights claims over 
harvested outer space resources all have analogous precedent in 
the United States’s treatment of UNCLOS and even some of the 
development of the treaty system governing Antarctica. 
D. Analogous International Law Regimes 
Although treaty regimes regarding other high-risk, high-
reward mining will not directly regulate the activities of private 
companies in space, they may provide guidance on expanding 
those obligations in the future.80  Therefore, both UNCLOS and 
the Antarctic Treaty represent potential future influence in outer 
space mining regimes and assistance in understanding actual 
space law obligations.  Further, the negotiation and ratification 
history surrounding UNCLOS is relevant because it depicts the 
United States’s rejection of an international regime in favor of 
domestic regulation respecting certain other aspects of 
international law.81  Additionally, the legal framework governing 
Antarctica is particularly relevant because the Outer Space 
Treaty drew some of its language directly from the Antarctic 
Treaty.82 
1. UNCLOS 
In the 1970s, governments and private companies began 
seriously considering mining the deep sea to monetize the 
significant mineral deposits available, despite the high costs and 
risk.83  UNCLOS opened for signature in 1982 in order to provide 
clear regulations for deep sea mining.84  UNCLOS was the first 
 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 156. 
80 See, e.g., Sattler, supra note 6, at 32–37 (discussing the Antarctic treaty 
system and UNCLOS as examples on which the international community could 
expand existing space law). 
81 Bilder, supra note 5, at 273–74; Buxton, supra note 56, at 699. 
82 H. G. Darwin, Note, The Outer Space Treaty, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 278, 279 
(1967). 
83 Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral 
Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer 
Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 822 (1990). 
84 Id. at 825; Sattler, supra note 6, at 34. 
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treaty to formally dispense with resources under the common 
heritage of mankind principle, and established an International 
Seabed Authority to do so.85  These two particular provisions led 
to the Reagan administration’s famous rejection of UNCLOS on 
the theory that subjecting deep sea resources to an international 
organization’s equitable management would crush free 
enterprise.86 
Next, in 1982, the United States passed the Deep Seabed 
Hard Mineral Resources Act to domestically regulate deep sea 
mining after rejecting UNCLOS.87  This law acts as a purely 
temporary measure to provide licenses to domestic entities 
seeking to exploit the deep seabed until a successful 
international regime is created.88  Even as a merely domestic law, 
the Act specifies that “commercial recovery of hard mineral 
resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas 
subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other 
states,” and that any uses should be in line with recognized 
principles of international law.89  Passing this law after rejecting 
the international structure of UNCLOS represents historical 
precedent of the United States regulating with unilateral action 
that at least remains conscious of some existing international 
obligations.90  The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act’s 
domestic licensing structure, in line with international 
obligations, looks very similar to SLCA, aside from the latter 
assumedly remaining permanent. 
In response to the United States rejecting UNCLOS and 
promulgating its own deep sea mining structure, the United 
Nations renegotiated the mining provisions in 1994.91  This 
amendment gave the United States several advantages, such as a 
permanent seat on the international agency, removal of the 
technology-sharing requirement originally in UNCLOS, and a 
permit-granting structure including a requirement to mine so 
entities could not stake an exclusionary claim while unable to 
 
85 Sattler, supra note 6, at 34–35; Heim, supra note 83, at 826–27. For more on 
the common heritage of mankind principle, see infra Section III.B. 
86 Bilder, supra note 5, at 263. 
87 Sattler, supra note 6, at 35–36. 
88 Id. 
89 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (2012). 
90 Bilder, supra note 5, at 273–74. 
91 Sattler, supra note 6, at 35. 
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mine.92  Although the United States signed the 1994 amendment, 
it has still refused to sign UNCLOS, despite renewed interest in 
doing so.93 
2. Antarctic Treaty 
Similarly, the Antarctic Treaty System provides an example 
of an international regime structured to manage resource 
acquisition in a risky, but potentially fruitful, area.94  After 
numerous States had claimed sovereignty over portions of 
Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 replaced these claims 
with a new legal regime.95  The agreement vested power in 
twenty-seven “Consultative parties,” who meet annually to make 
decisions as long as they continue to undertake a certain amount 
of activity in Antarctica.96  Because the treaty includes 
environmental requirements, research disclosure, and 
prohibitions against conflict, it is arguable that it implicates the 
common heritage of mankind principle.97  Regardless, the treaty 
only regulates resource rights as far as its other interfering 
provisions dictate.98  In this case, the Antarctic Treaty’s strict 
environmental controls effectively prevent resource acquisition 
rights, despite encouraging research.99 
In response to the Antarctic Treaty’s unsatisfactory resource 
regime, the United States and thirty-two other countries 
negotiated the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activities (“Antarctic Mineral Convention”) 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 36–37. 
94 Id. at 32; see generally Christopher C. Joyner, The Evolving Antarctic 
Minerals Regime, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 73 (1988). 
95 Christopher C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: Rethinking the 
Current Legal Dilemmas, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 417–20 (1981). 
96 Id. at 420; Sattler, supra note 6, at 32. For more on the controversy 
surrounding the format of this agreement, see Frakes, supra note 32, at 429–32; 
Joyner, supra note 94, at 420–21 (describing critics’ objections to the Antarctic 
“club”). 
97 Frakes, supra note 32, at 428; Joyner, supra note 94, at 425. 
98 Sattler, supra note 6, at 33. 
99 Id. This discrepancy is similar to some interpretations of the Outer Space 
Treaty that view the prohibition on claims of sovereignty fully prohibiting property 
rights as well. See supra Section II.A. In either case, the Antarctic Treaty contains 
much stricter environmental controls than the Outer Space Treaty because the 
Antarctic Treaty effectively designated Antarctica as a natural reserve. Sattler, 
supra note 6, at 33. 
FINAL_DIMARIA 10/20/2016  8:43 AM 
430 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:415   
completely outside of the United Nations.100  The agreement 
required mining parties to receive the consent of all other 
signatories to the treaty and retained substantially all of the 
environmental protections in the Antarctic Treaty.101  However, 
the Antarctic Mineral Convention failed to acquire signatures 
from all consultative parties—only sixteen at the time—and 
neither it, nor a significant replacement provision on resource 
rights, has entered into force to address Antarctic resources.102  
As it currently stands, Antarctic resource acquisition continues 
to be substantially halted, and less-developed countries continue 
to push for more participation in an area that arguably can be 
considered res communis and subject to the common heritage of 
mankind principle.103 
II. DISCUSSION 
Equipped with background knowledge on the current space 
law regime and analogous international law, a few other legal 
structures assist in analyzing the U.S. Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act’s (“SLCA”) viability in light of international 
obligations.  First, returning to Roman law property principles 
assists in pinpointing the limits of SLCA’s applicability in the 
context of the foregoing international obligations.  Next, the 
water law regime in the western United States exemplifies a 
modern use of classic Roman law property principles, a useful 
mark against which to examine and categorize SLCA. 
A. Res Communis v. Res Nullius 
Because outer space remains a widely untouched area, a 
return to early Roman law principles may prove useful in 
assessing how property rights may be quantified in the context of 
our current unclear international obligations.  Some scholars 
have already attempted to categorize property rights in outer 
space as either the res communis or res nullius paradigm from  
 
 
 
 
100 Heim, supra note 83, at 840. 
101 Id. at 841. 
102 Id. at 841–45. 
103 Id. at 844. 
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Roman law.104  As previously stated, these categories represent 
different classifications for things subject to varying types and 
extents of ownership.105 
First, the Romans classified things as res communis if the 
things were meant to be enjoyed and shared by all people in 
common.106  This category included air, water, and fish on the 
high seas, and precluded private ownership or intentional 
interference with others’ use.107  In stark contrast, res nullius 
included things not subject to standing ownership, but fully 
available to occupation, for example, by capture.108  Generally, 
law students become acquainted with this category in property 
class because gaining ownership of res nullius includes the 
classic capture of wild animals.109 
Second, the Roman law principles for obtaining ownership 
also provide some insight in the context of outer space resource 
ownership.  Dominium was the strongest property right in 
Roman law, acquired only if: (1) the owner had commercium, 
meaning that he was a Roman citizen or an expressly authorized 
foreigner;110 (2) the property was able to be privately owned; and 
(3) the property was obtained by an appropriate method.111  The 
property right structure under SLCA mirrors dominium well.  
First, commercium parallels the United States’s launch licensing, 
requiring all private entities to obtain a license granted by the 
government in order to leave orbit at all,112 just as the Romans 
needed commercium rights to later exercise dominium.  Second, 
SLCA endeavors to clarify that resources acquired from celestial 
bodies are amenable to private ownership, just like the second 
element of dominium.113  Third, SLCA dictates that resources  
 
 
104 See generally Gruner, supra note 36; Husby, supra note 48. 
105 See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text; DU PLESSIS, supra note 22, at 
152. 
106 DU PLESSIS, supra note 22, at 152. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
110 DU PLESSIS, supra note 22, at 156. Commercium was part of the rights 
granted specifically to Roman citizens. Id. Therefore, in order for a foreigner to be 
able to have dominium, he must have been expressly granted the right to hold 
property as a Roman citizen did. Id. 
111 Id. at 155–56. 
112 51 U.S.C. § 50904 (2012). 
113 Id. § 50903. 
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must be acquired in accordance with international obligations, 
mirroring dominium’s appropriate method requirement but 
providing a—still unclear—standard of those methods.114 
Alternatively, Roman law provides the concept of occupatio 
for claiming property in res nullius.115  Occupatio provided 
property rights to the individual who first claimed some property 
that had either never been claimed before or had been 
abandoned.116  This principle still exists in several instances of 
first-in-time, first-in-right claims in property.117  However, 
occupatio can only apply to res nullius, and it is unlikely that 
outer space can be either purely res nullius or res communis 
given the current treaty regime. 
B. Methods of Applying Roman Law to Present Day Space Law 
First, the res communis principle has found a more intense 
modern expression in the common heritage of mankind 
doctrine.118  While common heritage doctrine does not have a 
generally accepted definition, it implies any combination of five 
elements: (1) nonappropriation, (2) common management, 
(3) sharing of benefits, (4) peaceful purposes, and (5) preservation 
for future generations.119  Although res communis can include all 
five of these elements, common heritage of mankind doctrine’s 
expression has generally mandated less restrictive versions of 
each element.120  Further, others assert that the common 
heritage structure allows and even encourages resource 
harvesting.121  As stated previously, spacefaring nations seemed 
to reject the common heritage of mankind principle by refusing to 
sign the Moon Agreement.122  However, if negotiations produce a 
 
114 Id. 
115 DU PLESSIS, supra note 22, at 190. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. For example, see infra Section III.C on water law. 
118 For examples of the uses of common heritage doctrine in treaties, see supra 
Part II. 
119 The elements’ names are somewhat self-explanatory. But see Frakes, supra 
note 32, at 411–13, for a complete description. 
120 See generally Bilder, supra note 5 (discussing UNCLOS’s amendment as the 
international community limiting the common heritage principle, and the Moon 
Agreement’s language stating that the common heritage principle finds no 
expression outside of the terms of the agreement itself as a further loosening of the 
principle). 
121 Gilson, supra note 6, at 1393; Husby, supra note 48, at 370. 
122 See supra Section I.B. 
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highly limited res communis international structure, rather than 
a potentially restrictive expression under the common heritage 
principle, such an agreement could be amenable to spacefaring 
States in the future. 
Second, while negotiation tempering the common heritage of 
mankind principle may relax res communis enough to provide a 
successful international organization, perhaps clarifying rights 
and increasing regulation on pure res nullius principles through 
SLCA may result in an acceptable starting place for private 
entities seeking to exploit space resources.  In line with the 
international obligations guiding SLCA, outer space is no longer 
purely res nullius, because the Outer Space Treaty has imposed 
some environmental restrictions and a requirement of 
international cooperation.123  Some scholars have argued that the 
successful middle ground lies in exclusive zones for States to 
encourage industry but avoid giving spacefarers free reign.124  
Regardless, SLCA initially mitigates a pure res nullius approach 
by requiring that companies acquire resources consistent with 
international obligations, not merely by being first in time.125  
Further, it seems as though SLCA would shift ownership 
acquisition from occupatio of res nullius to something more 
analogous to dominium, as previously discussed.126  It seems as 
though SLCA aims for a res nullius approach by granting 
property rights to whomever is first in time, but does so in outer 
space, which is more similar to a res communis environment in 
light of the Outer Space Treaty’s ban on national appropriation.  
To better analyze international obligations as limitations on a 
pure res nullius approach, a different analogy is necessary. 
C. Harmful Interference and Water Law 
Certain States’ water law exemplifies significant first-in-
time, first-in-right property rights in modern law.127  In the 
context of water law, this right is referred to as “prior 
appropriation,” the first element of general property rights in 
 
123 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art. IX. 
124 Sattler, supra note 6, at 41–44; Schwetje, supra note 39, at 141. 
125 51 U.S.C.A. § 51303 (West 2015). 
126 See supra Section III.A. 
127 Michael Toll, Comment, Reimagining Western Water Law: Time-Limited 
Water Right Permits Based on a Comprehensive Beneficial Use Doctrine, 82 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 595, 600–01 (2011). 
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water.128  Secondly, an appropriator must put the water to 
beneficial use in order to maintain property rights.129  Beneficial 
use concerns both the type of use and the amount of use.130  Like 
the SPACE Act’s former harmful interference requirements of 
reasonableness in mining,131 beneficial use supplements first-in-
time property rights with an assurance that resources are 
actually being used rather than merely held.  Although the 
former civil action against harmful interference has since been 
removed, the principle still remains in the act, and points to at 
least some necessity for reasonable exclusionary rights over 
companies’ mining installations.132 
The prior appropriation doctrine worked well considering the 
small population in the western United States; however, as the 
population grew and the stability of water sources decreased, 
prior appropriation began to demonstrate its lack of efficiency.133  
Because prior appropriation doctrine protects any beneficial use, 
even low value uses like growing plants of lower economic value 
could be prioritized over a subsequent appropriator’s need for 
drinking water.134  In order to remedy this potential situation, 
scholars have suggested the need for equitable principles, or at 
least reevaluating the extent of beneficial uses and issuing some 
rights pursuant to time-limited permits.135 
Although space resources are seemingly infinite, some 
asteroids are more costly to reach than others.  As more parties 
seek resource rights and obtain what may still be construed as 
exclusionary “harmful interference” rights on the more accessible 
celestial bodies, this approach will come closer to defeating the 
free exploration and use driving our space law.136  Although some 
water law regimes worked well for a significant length of time, 
the recent call for change illuminates a potential downfall for  
 
 
 
128 Id. at 597. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 604. 
131 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
132 Id. 
133 Toll, supra note 127, at 597–98. 
134 Id. at 608–09. 
135 Id. at 617; Duane Rudolph, Why Prior Appropriation Needs Equity, 18 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 348, 389 (2015). 
136 Buxton, supra note 56, at 700. 
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SLCA in the distant future.  Outer space mining regulations that 
aim for a res nullius approach will likely breach international 
obligations if outer space ever becomes significantly saturated.137 
Conversely, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty itself allows 
parties to seek consultation if they anticipate “harmful 
interference” by another party.138  Because at least some basis of 
exclusionary rights against harmful interference exist in the 
international obligations of the United States, the principle 
under SLCA may ultimately remain consistent with 
international obligations.  This tension keeps the international 
legality of SLCA just as unclear as the United States’s 
international obligations themselves.  However, the suggestion 
for time-limited permits on a first-in-time basis provides another 
interesting element for solving the problem before it occurs in 
outer space. 
III. PREVIOUSLY OFFERED SOLUTIONS AND A FURTHER PROPOSAL 
Because space law is so sparse, many scholars have offered 
methods of resolving the ambiguity of property rights in space.  
These various approaches all present interesting, long-term 
solutions, but mostly require widespread international 
cooperation that may be difficult to achieve.  However, many of 
these structures can come to fruition after—or in conjunction 
with—the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 
(“SLCA”).  Ultimately, while an international organization 
established to manage outer space property rights is a noble goal, 
SLCA is a more viable short-term option for incentivizing private 
actors to advance outer space activities, given a few time and 
event-sensitive restrictions so that it does not outlive its 
usefulness. 
A. Scholars’ Proposed Property Regimes in Outer Space 
Many scholars offer a variety of broad international solutions 
to better allocate property rights in space resources.139  First, 
many suggestions use existing international structures to guide 
 
137 As mentioned throughout this Note, resources must be acquired consistently 
with international obligations. 51 U.S.C.A. § 51303 (West 2015). 
138 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, art. IX. 
139 Tennen, supra note 62, at 824–30 (compiling various scholars’ recommended 
international organizations); Bilder, supra note 5, at 297–99; Sattler, supra note 6, 
at 37–44. 
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the property discussion, including the framework of the 
International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement 
(“IGA”).140  Under this agreement, NASA has signed a series of 
agreements with various other States’ space programs to share 
funding and technology for the International Space Station’s 
(“ISS”) operation.141  While NASA conducts the overall 
administration of this system, each individual funder retains 
ownership and jurisdiction over its own module and crew.142  
Under this structure, private companies could still fund their 
own enterprises and reap the benefits, while having NASA or a 
nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) coordinate parties to 
avoid interference.143  Further, if bilateral treaties and NGO 
management become international obligations to which 
American private parties must conform under SLCA, no 
compliance issues would seem to arise in ensuring property 
rights in harvested resources. 
Exclusive economic zones as created and defined by 
UNCLOS present another familiar alternative for ensuring 
property rights in outer space.144  In its present form as applied 
to maritime coastlines, every country has exclusive rights to 
exploit and manage the maritime resources within a certain 
distance from its coast, but cannot prohibit other countries from 
navigating through the exclusive zone.145  In outer space, an 
already-existing international organization, like the ITU or 
INTELSAT, could allocate certain areas on celestial bodies to 
different States for building installations with the understanding 
that a certain exclusive economic zone would radiate from that 
location.146  While the activities taking place in exclusive 
economic zones would remain consistent with SLCA’s grant of 
property rights, this structure would require an international 
organization, the optimal structure of which remains unclear.147 
Alternatively, an international organization could divide 
celestial bodies into shares for each country to presently or 
eventually exploit, as opposed to a system of arising economic 
 
140 Sattler, supra note 6, at 37. 
141 Id. at 37–38. 
142 Id. at 38. 
143 Id. at 38–39. 
144 Id. at 41–42. 
145 Id. at 42. 
146 Id. at 43–44. 
147 See infra Section III.B. 
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zones.148  Although this structure would ensure rights for 
developing nations, it causes the same issues of requiring an 
international organization to divide celestial bodies in the first 
place, and seems somewhat unadaptable to mining asteroids—
bodies that remain harder to track than planets or moons.  
Further, this structure may directly interfere with the free 
exploration and use principles in Article I of the Outer Space 
Treaty. 
Each of these proposals requires some form of international 
organization, and accession to the Moon Agreement would 
facilitate its negotiation under Article 11(5).149  Like most of the 
other options discussed in this section, the viability of accession 
remains dependent on examining what a successful international 
management system would look like. 
If spacefaring countries are to negotiate an acceptable 
international management organization for space resources, they 
need to include a few key powers.150  A successful international 
organization should include mechanisms for registration of 
claims, notice between parties, and dispute resolution.151  
Additionally, the organization should ensure that private entities 
can undertake all mining activities necessary to obtain space 
resources, affirmatively including roles for private companies to 
bring all interested parties into the structure of the agreement.152  
All of these provisions are consistent with SLCA, with each 
somewhat represented in the language of the act itself.153 
Protecting the resource interests of nonspacefaring countries 
represents a further issue in forming this organization.  One 
possible solution entails language that results in resource 
sharing only after the entity that obtained the resources makes a 
fair profit for its risk.154  Alternatively, this organization could set 
a flat rate, obtaining a small portion of all resources acquired and 
distributing them to nonspacefaring members of the 
 
148 Jacobsen, supra note 6, at 177. 
149 For more on the Moon Agreement, see supra Section II.B. 
150 Tennen, supra note 62, at 823–24. 
151 Id. 
152 Bilder, supra note 5, at 280–81. 
153 For more on SLCA, which mentions affirmative grants of property rights in 
harvested materials, the role of private enterprise, and consistency with 
international law, see supra Part I. 
154 Bilder, supra note 5, at 281. 
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organization.155  In either case, SLCA would remain in 
compliance because respecting the rules and decisions of any 
international organization by which the United States is bound 
would constitute international obligations of the United States 
and, therefore, of the private companies themselves. 
B. SLCA in Compliance: Synthesizing Short-Term and Long-
Term Solutions 
While some argue that an international agreement seems to 
be the best answer to the property rights problem in outer space, 
that solution may be far on the horizon or overly naïve given the 
new domestic resource rights under SLCA.  Unless a future 
international obligation alters the current space law structure, 
the primary obligations that SLCA imports to spaceflight 
companies in mining remain those under the Outer Space 
Treaty.156  As discussed previously,157 it does not appear that any 
present international obligations are stopping private spaceflight 
companies from gaining property rights in harvested resources.158  
However, it is still important to note that, in the future, the 
upper bounds of the Outer Space Treaty may limit private 
mining by ensuring that private companies cannot infringe on 
“free . . . exploration and use by all.”159  Continued unilateral 
action and the principle of prohibiting harmful interference could 
eventually lead to excluding other parties seeking to make use of 
outer space. 
Therefore, a permanent, long-term solution must resolve the 
limitations that SLCA will put on other entities in both time and 
space.  First, although space resources are potentially limitless, 
the amount of resources currently amenable to harvesting are 
certainly limited in light of humanity’s current technological 
capacity.160  Similar to issues faced in water law, the accessible 
resources in space may eventually become appropriated and 
inefficiently utilized under SLCA without any potential for use 
by nations from whom the United States is obligated to allow free 
 
155 Jacobsen, supra note 6, at 178. 
156 See supra Section II.A. 
157 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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exploration and use.161  If the vast majority of accessible celestial 
bodies simultaneously undergo use by private companies 
authorized by SLCA, these companies may restrict the use of 
other parties and breach international obligations, contrary to 
the authorizations of SLCA. 
Second, the resource regime under SLCA is similar to water 
law in that it may eventually become unsustainable without 
imposing any equitable principles over a longer period of time.162  
Without sustainable regulations in place as early as possible, 
space could eventually become saturated, excluding future 
parties from use and exploration by allowing exclusionary rights 
to prior appropriators.  Although it may seem farfetched to 
prepare a legal regime with such a distant future in mind, a lack 
of similarly forward thinking led to the present dilemma by 
leaving outer space property rights vague while the technology to 
obtain such rights ripened. 
In order to allow SLCA to incentivize the development of 
outer space by private enterprise, but halt growth before it 
begins to breach international obligations, a sunset provision is 
an effective solution.  Reevaluating SLCA after a twenty to 
thirty-year term would allow ample time for companies to even 
more rapidly develop their spacefaring technology, reap some 
benefits of space resources, and accomplish it all before allowing 
outer space to become crowded. 
An even more effective sunset provision finds precedent in 
the United States’s treatment of UNCLOS.163  After rejecting 
UNCLOS, the United States passed its own domestic legislation, 
stressing that it was a temporary measure until a satisfactory 
international agreement could be reached.164  Formalizing this 
concept into a sunset provision on the property rights reform of 
SLCA would ensure that the Act’s structure would remain in 
place only until an international organization would render that 
structure unnecessary.  The provision would be simple to craft, 
effectively terminating SLCA’s property rights regime once the 
United States—and perhaps a certain minimum number of other  
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States—has ratified an agreement that establishes an 
international management organization for outer space 
resources. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, SLCA’s property provisions provide an inelegant, 
yet acceptable method to affirmatively grant property rights in 
outer space resources, allaying some fears of the private 
spaceflight industry.  However, some upper boundary on SLCA is 
necessary in the very long term, before an under-regulated res 
nullius regime causes exhaustion of attainable resources and 
breaches the “free . . . exploration and use” terms of the Outer 
Space Treaty.  As previously discussed, likely the best way to 
temper such an aggressive property rights regime while 
retaining its benefits is through a sunset provision, for a set term 
of years or until an effective international organization is 
established, whichever happens first. 
Clarified property rights in outer space are necessary, not 
merely for the financial incentives, but so the attainable wealth 
can galvanize private enterprise to further develop technology for 
later use in exploration for the good of all mankind.  Although 
preemptive law granting rights in space rocks may seem like a 
very narrow goal, the common good of humanity advanced by this 
small incentive is incalculable. 
